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Between the mid-1960s and 1998, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), a 
radical paramilitary group not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Ireland, sought 
to liberate Northern Ireland from British rule through force of arms and unify all of Ireland under 
one independent Irish nation. In response to the PIRA’s campaign of violence, British military 
intelligence adopted counter terrorism measures, which included the recruitment and handling of 
PIRA informants (collusion) in order to infiltrate the paramilitary group’s command network. 
Collusion, as defined, is a clandestine or illegal cooperation or conspiracy, with the intent to 
cheat or deceive others. 
The counter-terrorism tactics employed by the British Special Air Service (SAS) and the 
Force Research Unit (FRU), focused specifically on collusion within the PIRA. The legality and 
ethicality of state-organized collusion has been a difficult topic for discussion both politically 
and philosophically. By examining the Northern Irish counter-terrorism campaign orchestrated 
by the British government, it becomes evident that the British government fell into a slippery-
slope of state-sponsored terrorism. Both the FRU and the SAS effectively violated the British 
legal system in their war on terror, the very system they were trying to enforce in Northern 
Ireland. Collusion, though effective in defeating the PIRA’s ability to wage terrorism, proved to 
be legally and ethically reprehensible but ultimately justifiable. 
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) formed in 1919 by Michael Collins, a participant in the 
Easter Rising and a leading Republican, was a militant nationalist organization that advocated 
using armed forces to render British rule in Ireland ineffective with the ultimate goal of unifying 
Ireland under one independent republic. Historian Richard English states in his book Armed 
Struggle: The History of the IRA that during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921, the IRA adopted 
guerilla tactics such as ambushes, raids, and sabotage with the goal of forcing the British 
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government to negotiate.1 The ensuing political settlement reached via negotiations established a 
Free State in which the new Irish government claimed dominion over 26 counties while six of 
the nine counties in the province of Ulster formed a new statelet called Northern Ireland which 
remained part of the United Kingdom. A substantial number of hardline IRA members disagreed 
with the treaty, refusing to settle for anything less than a 32-county unified Ireland. 
Consequently, the IRA split into two separate groups: a pro-treaty faction led by Michael Collins 
that formed the core of the Irish Free State Army and another group, known as the ‘Irregulars’ 
and led by Eamon de Valera, an Irish politician and Easter Rising participant, organized armed 
resistance against the new Free State government. However, in the ensuing Irish Civil War 
(1922-1923), the Irregulars capitulated, without surrendering their arms or disbanding, with the 
result that during the 1930s and 1940s, they continued to conduct an intermittent campaign of 
violence under the banner of the IRA.2 Their request for aid from Hitler’s Germany consequently 
caused considerable embarrassment for the neutral Irish Republican government during World 
War II. 
 According to historians Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, acts of violence perpetrated by 
the IRA were sporadic during the 1950s and into the early 1960s, as many Catholics in Northern 
Ireland did not support the paramilitary group.3 However, in the late 1960s, many Northern Irish 
Catholics supported the fledgling civil rights movement that campaigned against discrimination 
in employment, voting and housing by the predominantly Protestant government. In Tim Pat 
Coogan’s book, The IRA, he states that protests and counter protests by both Catholic and 
                                                          
1 English, Richard Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. London: Pan, 2012, 31. 
2 Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006, 17. 
3 Bew, Paul, and Gordon Gillespie. Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles. Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillan, 1993, 19. 
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Protestants led to further support for the IRA within the Catholic community.4 Historians Eamon 
Collins and Mick McGovern state that beginning in 1970, the IRA conducted bombings, 
assassinations, ambushes and kidnappings in a campaign declared the ‘Long War.’5 In 1973, the 
IRA expanded these attacks to mainland Britain and continental Europe. An estimated 3,600 
people were killed between 1969 and 1994 as a direct result of the violence. The British policy of 
interning individuals suspected of participating in the IRA as well as the events of Bloody 
Sunday on January 30, 1972, in which 13 Catholic protesters were killed, strengthened Catholic 
support for the IRA, swelling its ranks and boosting its ability to fundraise. Further evidence of 
IRA attacks can be seen in the extensive coverage published in contemporary newspaper articles. 
Headlines such as "Bomb Blast at Belfast Army Post" and "Belfast: Why These Young Soldiers 
Died" taken from clippings from the Sunday Times provide two examples of how the IRA attacks 
on British military forces in Northern Ireland were reported.6 Such documentation provides 
further media evidence of the terrorist attacks.  
The literature concerning the Irish Troubles and more specifically the role British 
Intelligence played in its attempts to dismantle the Irish Republican Army is relatively recent as 
much of it was first published in the 1990s and during the first decade of the 21st century. This is 
due both in part to the fact that the history of the Irish Troubles and its consequences are still 
being explored but also because the British government continues to withhold classified 
documents concerning the conflict. Regardless of the inaccessible historical evidence contained 
                                                          
4 Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA. 2006, 34. 
5 Collins, Eamon, and Mick McGovern. Killing Rage. London: Granta Books, 1999, 11. 
6 "Belfast: Why These Young Soldiers Died." Sunday Times [London, England], 14 Mar. 1971. 
The Sunday Times Digital Archive. http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu. 
Jacobs, Eric. "Bomb Blast at Belfast Army Post." Sunday Times [London, England], 1 Feb. 1970. 
The Sunday Times Digital Archive. http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu 
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within government archives, many historians have drawn on other sources to explore this period 
in Northern Irish history. First of all, evidence of British collusion within the PIRA comes from 
firsthand accounts shared by informants who operated as undercover British intelligence agents. 
Much of the existing historical debate concerning collusion within the PIRA leans towards the 
view that collusion was indeed effective in disrupting the PIRA’s terrorism campaign as well as 
the group’s command structure. Martin Ingram, a whistleblowing former British intelligence 
officer and FRU handler, and Greg Harkin, a Belfast journalist notorious for breaking the story 
of Stakeknife, the codename for a British secret agent within the IRA, both argue in their book 
Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents In Ireland that collusion tactics were effective in disrupting 
the PIRA’s operations.7 Collusion, they argue, provided the British with valuable inside 
intelligence as undercover agents infiltrated the organization to the highest levels of command. 
According to Ingram, this infiltration created considerable problems for the PIRA as active 
operations became bogged down due to the difficulty of weeding out double agents. 
Historians such as Ed Moloney, author of A Secret History of the IRA, and Matthew 
Teague, author of “Double Blind: The Untold Story of How British Intelligence Infiltrated and 
Undermined the Irish Republican Army,” both discovered in their independent research that 
British efforts at collusion were arguably illegal and morally unethical. 8 Both found that the 
British authorities would go to extreme lengths to maintain undercover agents’ identities, even to 
the extent of allowing agents to kill innocent civilians or other undercover agents in order to 
remain undercover. 9 Many members of both the FRU and the SAS claim that before questioning 
                                                          
7 Ingram, Martin, and Greg Harkin. Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland. Dublin: O’ 
Brien, 2004, 16. 
8 Moloney, Ed A Secret History of the IRA. London: Penguin Books, 2003, 311. 
9 Teague, Matthew. “Double Blind: The Untold Story of How British Intelligence Infiltrated and 
Undermined the Irish Republican Army.” Atlantic Monthly. 2006. 
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the morality behind collusion, we must look at whether such actions can be justified because they 
served a “greater good.”10 The rationale behind the term “greater good” is that sacrifices must be 
made in order to benefit the majority of society. Collusion tactics that incurred civilian deaths 
were rationalized with this “greater good” in mind.  
Ingram’s research reveals that collusion was a counter-terrorist tactic that British 
intelligence used to establish undercover agents within the IRA terrorist organization.11 This 
tactic, according to Ingram, provided British intelligence with knowledge of the IRA’s command 
structure, those affiliated with the group, their arms deals, and the group’s potential future 
targets. According the Ingram, the FRU was a British Army Intelligence Corps unit working in 
Northern Ireland that recruited and developed the Army’s human intelligence assets in the war 
on the IRA and was sponsored and directed by the Director of Special Forces (DSF). Operating 
from 1980 into the early 1990s, the FRU performed intelligence gathering operations against the 
IRA. Ingram states that British military intelligence used collusion tactics by establishing contact 
with individuals who were willing to spy on the IRA. According to Ingram, agents that were the 
most successful in the job were those with a skill set that allowed them to lie to everyone. This 
included lying to their families, friends, fellow IRA members and even at times to their handlers 
in the FRU or fellow agents. Possibly the best example of collusion carried out by British 
intelligence was agent Stakeknife. Stakeknife was the codename for Frederick (Freddy) 
Scappaticci, a son of an Italian immigrant who grew up in Belfast. Scappaticci joined the IRA in 
1974 after having been interned and placed in detention the previous year. However, he 
                                                          
10 Ingram, Martin, and Greg Harkin. Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland. 2004, 16. 
11 Ibid., 21. 
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approached British intelligence in 1978 and became a member of the FRU at its inception in 
1980.12  
By 1980, Ingram reports that Scappaticci had also become a lead member of the Internal 
Security Unit (ISU) for the Irish Republican Army Northern Command. The ISU was tasked 
with investigating leaks and exposing potential informers and was often referred to as the 
“nutting squad,” and Ingram reports that Scappaticci’s placement in the ISU provided British 
intelligence with direct access to IRA intelligence briefings, command structure and future 
operations.13 Due to Scappaticci’s access to the inner workings of the IRA command structure, 
he quickly became one of the most highly valued agents working in the FRU’s network of 
collusion. Eamon Collins, a member of the IRA until leaving the group in the late 1980s, states 
in his book Killing Rage that Scappaticci was the IRA’s lead interrogator and executioner and 
that he was linked to more than 40 murders.14 Scappaticci’s role in finding and killing informers 
garnered him a reputation of ruthlessness even within the IRA. Collins notes that Scappaticci 
executed loyalists, republicans, police officers and innocent bystanders, all under the watchful 
eye of British intelligence who were paying him £80,000 a year. In order to maintain 
Scappaticci’s cover in the IRA, British intelligence allowed the murders to go on, occasionally 
even selecting who Scappaticci should kill. According to Ingram, Scappatici at times even 
interrogated other British agents. This inside network and back handling explains why the Irish 
Troubles is often referred to as the “Dirty War.” As a result of the policy of state-sponsored 
terrorism, British intelligence through the work of the Force Research Unit had access to 
information that enabled them to prevent attacks. But because preventing attacks risked exposing 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 23. 
13 Ibid., 45. 
14 Collins, Eamon, and Mick McGovern. Killing Rage. 1999, 42. 
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agents, British intelligence would pick and choose when and when not to act. Ingram points out 
that in order for him to work in British intelligence, he himself had to rationalize that allowing 
certain attacks to unfold was simply necessary for the greater good. Allowing a person or group 
to die one day, he argues, could save the lives of more the next. 
Ingram and Collins both agree in their independent works that collusion was an effective 
strategy used by British intelligence to counter the IRA terror campaign. Collins acknowledges 
that the IRA never suspected members like Scappaticci to be informers.15 Collins states that 
while he was a member of the IRA, the group operated under the belief that British agents and 
informers could not possibly commit murder, which was the very atrocity Scappaticci carried out 
while in the IRA. Because British intelligence condoned state killings, many double agents were 
able to maintain their cover within the organization by becoming killers. Because British 
intelligence orchestrated state terrorism, the tactic of collusion placed the legal system in 
jeopardy as collusion broke the enforcement laws of Northern Ireland. Though the police and 
military forces were given extreme powers such as the power to try terrorist cases without a jury, 
collusion, with its practice of state-organized murder, took the power of the British intelligence 
community too far. Collusion, as it was implemented during the “Irish Troubles,” was a human 
rights violation against both British and Irish citizens.  
A case in which collusion demonstrated a serious degree of both immoral and illegal 
activity by British intelligence occurred with the murder of Irishman Tom Oliver. According to 
Ingram’s personal accounts as a FRU handler, Oliver’s murder by the IRA in 1991 was a 
sacrifice made by the FRU to maintain the cover of British informant and double-agent, 
                                                          
15 Ibid.  
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Scappaticci.16 In this case, Oliver was an Irish citizen living in the County Louth peninsula of 
Cooley just over the border in the Republic of Ireland. Ingram states that the FRU “were allowed 
to murder the citizens of the Irish Republic” as the FRU and other British agencies “did not 
recognize the border that divides Ireland.”17 In this case, Oliver himself was a British informer 
for the FRU. His information, according to Ingram, “over the eight years prior to his death, led to 
the arrests of at least eight republicans and the recovery of a number of weapons.”18 But Ingram 
states that Oliver’s lack of expertise as well as not being a full time, highly paid agent, led to his 
death. Ingram states that the IRA discovered Oliver was an informer by ‘bugging’ the payphone 
that Oliver used to contact his FRU handler. Ingram states in his accounts that the IRA member 
who had volunteered to bug the payphone was also working for the FRU. In this case, according 
to Ingram, the security forces had to decide whether Oliver would live or die. The Forced 
Research Unit had an opportunity in the Oliver case to improve Scappaticci’s standing within the 
IRA. Allowing Scappaticci to murder Oliver would provide him with the standing needed to 
maintain his own cover, and in the case with Oliver, the FRU decided that Oliver was an 
expendable asset. Oliver’s body was found “dumped in a field near Belleek, County Armagh, 
less that forty-eight hours after his abduction” by Scappaticci and the ‘nutting’ squad (IRA 
interrogation unit).19 The father of seven had been tortured and shot repeatedly to the head and 
according to Ingram, Scappaticci confirmed his involvement in the interrogation by informing 
his handlers that Oliver had confessed to being a British informer during the interrogation.20 
                                                          
16 Ingram, Martin, and Greg Harkin. Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland. 2004, 111. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 112. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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Oliver’s story provides additional support to the conclusion that the tactic of collusion required 
unethical action. 
In the case of Tom Oliver, the FRU and the British intelligence community made the 
executive decision to allow the death of an Irish citizen who had been working for British 
intelligence to take place. In this case, the FRU had the information available to prevent Oliver’s 
death but instead used his murder to advance another agent’s standing within the IRA. This case 
presents the grim and unethical implications that developed alongside the use of collusion as a 
counter terrorist tactic. In this case, the victim, interrogator and killer were all, according to 
former FRU handler Martin Ingram, active agents working for British authorities. Collusion as 
used in Oliver’s case as a counter-terrorism strategy, required state-sponsored terrorism, thus 
reiterating that collusion had both an immoral and illegal quality. What complicated the case 
further was the post-mortem examination of Tom Oliver’s body. According to Ingram, a priest 
who examined Oliver’s body, stated that “it looked like they’d dropped concrete blocks on every 
bone in his body.”21 The grizzly torture and execution of Irish citizen and British informant Tom 
Oliver had been carried out by another British agent, Scappaticci, all under the guidance and 
direction of the FRU. From this case, it becomes evident that collusion worked in tandem with 
state on state terrorism.  
  A BBC documentary program on collusion by Daragh McIntyre and Bronach Walsh, first 
broadcast in 2015, also details the extent to which collusion led to many hundreds of murders 
during the Northern Ireland conflict.22 According to the documentary, agents and informers 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 McIntyre, Daragh, and Bronach Walsh, BBC Programme on Collusion BBC News 
Documentary. September 20, 2016. Accessed 24 Oct. 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TRgZ-mvQpU&t=1189s. 
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played an active role in the murder of hundreds of people, all, according to British authorities, 
for the “greater good.” The documentary never explicitly names the agents interviewed, even 
going to the extent of having voice actors for those who were interviewed to protect their 
identities. However, those interviewed confirm the extent to which collusion was used by British 
intelligence during the Northern Irish conflict as well as the extent to which colluders were able 
to continue their terrorist activities while under the guidance of the British intelligence 
community. One terror case the documentary covers was the death of Colleen McMurray on 27 
March, 1992. She was a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the police force operating in 
Northern Ireland between 1922 and 2001. She was killed by an IRA horizontal mortar attack on 
her armored patrol car in Merchants Quay, Newry. Though the attack was carried out by the 
IRA, the BBC’s documentary interview by Daragh McIntyre reveals that “it was a state agent 
inside the IRA who had helped develop the very particular device used in the attack.”23 
McIntyre’s interview with Peter Keeley, a former agent for the Forced Research Unit, reveals 
that Keeley had infiltrated the IRA and had worked in a bomb-making facility based in Dundalk, 
Ireland. Keeley openly admits in the interview that he helped develop IRA explosive devices. 
When discussing the bomb facility, Keeley states that “They developed bombs, they developed 
new explosives…everything. I was a part of that team and I was there and I was able to see what 
developments were going.”24 Keeley does not claim he was directly involved in the murder of 
Colleen McMurray according to interviewer McIntyre, but he does state that he helped design 
the technology that fired the rocket remotely. Keeley states that security forces and intelligence 
knew about this technology because “I had told them.”25 According to Keeley, British 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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intelligence knew the name of the IRA member who had the explosive device, knew that the IRA 
was preparing to use the device in an attack, but did not know the location or time in which the 
attack would take place. It was confirmed that Keeley had visited his FRU handlers and had 
notified them of the device two weeks before the murder of Colleen McMurray, once again 
demonstrating that British intelligence had ample warning time to prevent the attack as they were 
aware of the individual with the device.  
 What further suggests the state had a hand in the murder of Colleen McMurray, as noted 
in McIntyre and Walsh’s BBC documentary is that “all the evidence from the murder scene has 
disappeared. The police station log book which recorded threats also vanished.”26 Keeley states 
that in order for his work to continue as an agent, he “had to break the law.”27 His work as an 
agent protected him from prosecution. In the interview, McIntyre asked Keeley, “How much 
impunity did you have?” Keeley’s response was “an easy way to describe it was I walked on 
water.”28 In this case the state paid an agent to develop a bomb that killed a police officer. 
Keeley notes in the interview that he did save lives and that his intelligence put other IRA 
members in jail, but he was unwilling to say openly during the interview when asked if he had 
directly murdered innocent people to maintain his own cover. To this day, Phillip McMurray, 
Colleen McMurray’s husband, is attempting to get a full report on the case, but justice has been 
thwarted as all evidence pertaining to the case is presently missing.29  
The documentary provides other instances that suggest the state was suppressing 
information concerning agent-affiliated IRA attacks. In several cases, the documentary notes that 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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missing weapons in unsolved murder cases mysteriously turned up in military museums. One 
such case involved an assault rifle that had been used in seven unsolved murders on public and 
which ended up on display at the Imperial War Museum. Through forensic tests it was 
discovered that the rifle was the same one used in an attack on a Belfast betting shop in 1992 as 
well as an attack by a Protestant paramilitary on the Ormeau Road that killed five Catholics, one 
a 15-year old boy. 30 Such discoveries suggest that law enforcement and British intelligence 
tampered with evidence in unsolved and ongoing investigations in an attempt to cover up the 
history.  
 Another BBC documentary, BBC NI Spotlight Examines the Intelligence War Against the 
IRA, follows reporter Jennifer O’Leary’s investigation of collusion and Britain’s secret agents. 
The documentary claimed that “informers and agents were the state’s most deadly weapon in a 
secret intelligence war.”31 The documentary’s focus concerns the contact made with a man who 
identifies himself under the alias name of Martin. Martin claims he “brought Special Branch 
deep within the republican movement.”32 In the documentary, Martin claims to have been an 
agent of the state who infiltrated the IRA. According to the interview with former Special Branch 
Officer Raymond White, White states in the documentary interview that “Agents had to be 
selected and, if possible, placed or manipulated into certain positions and allowed to develop and 
grow. If you looked upon agents and those, they’re sort of a cancer within, a slow-growing 
cancer--they can sort of infect other parts of the system.33 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 O’Leary, Jennifer. “BBC NI Spotlight examines the intelligence war against the IRA.” BBC 
News Documentary. 20 Sept. 2016. Accessed 24 Oct. 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
northern-ireland-37420460. 
32 Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
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White’s main claim in the interview focuses on collusion as a useful counter-terrorist strategy 
that provided British intelligence with a means to gather intelligence on the IRA as well as 
disrupt and “infect” the organization’s ability to wage a terror campaign. The problem is that 
collusion required British intelligence to actively participate in acts of terror to ensure that 
collusion worked. One part of the documentary covers Denis Bradley, a member of the 
Consultative Group on the Past. Bradley’s examination of the London archive of classified 
documents concerning the Troubles found that at any one time, the security services were 
running about 800 informers throughout the Troubles. As Bradley observes, “Now that’s a lot of 
people within a very small community of people.”34 This suggests that the number of informers 
and double agents working within the organization was significant as the IRA as a whole was 
believed to only have 30,000 members or affiliates throughout the entire period of the Troubles 
(1970-1997). In his interview with reporter Jennifer O’Leary, Denis Bradley concludes, “I think 
we won the intelligence war” but adds that “the war we lost was the propaganda war.”35  
As collusion became public knowledge, the notion to name the Irish war a ‘dirty’ war 
developed, especially in wake of the peace agreement established in 1998. More and more 
evidence began to emerge that suspected informers had been working for British intelligence and 
had lived double lives within the IRA. One such agent was Denis Donaldson. In 2005, long after 
the peace process was signed in 1998, the Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams openly declared that 
Donaldson had been working as a double agent planted inside Sinn Fein.36 Sinn Fein is a left-
wing Irish Republican party originally founded in 1905 but which rose to recent prominence in 
1970 and was notorious for being associated with the IRA.37 Donaldson openly admitted to 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Richard, English. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. London: Pan, 2012, 42. 
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being an agent shortly after Adams’ declaration. Martin, the anonymous agent interviewed in the 
BBC documentary, states that “as soon as he [Donaldson uttered the words I knew he would be 
killed because that is the only sentence or penalty you could get for traitors.”38 Donaldson’s 
outing as a British agent, according to the BBC special documentary, greatly angered the IRA, 
especially Sinn Fein groups in South Armagh, which Donaldson had helped establish. He was 
also an intermediator between IRA leaders in Armagh and Republican leaders in Belfast.39 His 
high rank and role within the IRA network ensured he would be targeted by the IRA. Donaldson 
was found shot dead in his cottage on April 4, 2006. The anonymous agent ‘Martin’ confirmed 
that the IRA had killed Donaldson and also claims that the president of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams, 
had sanctioned the death of Donaldson. The case of Donaldson provides support to the claim that 
collusion was a strategy which evolved in the shadows and that many prominent IRA members 
could have been participants in collusion.40  
However, many previous British officials in the intelligence community that have come 
forward, like Ingram, argue that though collusion was a dirty strategy, it was an effective strategy 
and ultimately saved lives. One example of how British collusion within the IRA ranks worked 
to prevent deaths was illustrated when British intelligence stepped in to prevent an IRA bombing 
in Gibraltar. The event became known as the Gibraltar Incident/Flavius Operation. The incident 
involved the killing of three members of the IRA on March 6, 1988, in Gibraltar. The three IRA 
members, Seán Savage, Daniel McCann, and Mairéad Farrell, were believed to be mounting a 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
Haughey 15 
 
bombing attack. The three were unarmed when Special Air Service (SAS) members dressed in 
plain clothes opened fire in the streets, killing all three.41 
The Gibraltar Incident brought considerable media attention to British intelligence’s use 
of collusion and excessive force. Witnesses stated the three IRA members appeared to be 
surrendering. Newspaper records of the event bore headlines such as “Gibraltar bombers killed 
trying to give up,” “Mystery IRA girl knew of ambush,” “SAS Told to Shoot to Kill Says Ex-
Soldier” and “IRA hunts for top-level mole.” Patrick Hill reported that a new witness of the 
Gibraltar Incident, a translator named Carmen, claimed that IRA bombers Mairéad Farrell and 
Danny McCann were shot while holding their hands in the air.42 Hill reported that this new 
witness was the first person who claimed to have seen how the shooting started and had sworn an 
affidavit confirming her evidence. Carmen’s claim, notes Hill, was that she witnessed Farrell and 
McCann being “finished off with gunshots as they lay on the ground” near the petrol stations 
where the incident happened. According to the witness, she watched from her apartment as three 
SAS men got out of a police car and jumped over a barrier with guns drawn. She then alleged 
that the SAS members opened fire on two of the IRA bombers who were walking in front of the 
petrol station. When the IRA members saw the SAS men with guns drawn, the witness claims 
she saw the IRA members put their hands up as if to surrender, but were immediately gunned 
down.43 The allegations made by the witness Carmen sparked considerable debate over the SAS 
and its use of excessive force. Hill’s article provides evidence that the British intelligence 
community and the forces they operated took considerable legal and ethical liberties in their 
operations to prevent the IRA from pursuing terrorist attacks.  
                                                          
41 Hill, Patrick. “Gibraltar Bombers killed trying to give up.” Daily Mail, 28 Mar. 1988. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. 
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This use of excessive force is further reinforced by Jim Campbell’s article (“SAS Told to 
Shoot to Kill Says Ex-Soldier”).44 In the article, Campbell reported on his interview with a 
former SAS soldier who withheld his name. According to the interview, the SAS ex-soldier 
stated that “it wouldn’t have made any difference whether the suspects had guns or not since the 
SAS never waited to find out.” He further claimed that “The SAS can shoot first and let someone 
else ask the questions later. SAS soldiers know the British Government will always cover for 
them and clear up the mess afterwards and that they will never be called to public account.” 45 
According to written regulations, members of the elite anti-terrorist regiment could only fire if 
they thought a terrorist act had just been committed or was about to be committed, but the ex-
member of the SAS claims in Campbell’s article that those orders were “window-dressing” and 
not meant to be taken seriously. He stated that “you’re not expected to take prisoners. You’re 
told to kill or be killed and that if you only wound someone they could live long enough to get in 
one fatal shot.”46 Campbell’s interview with this ex-SAS soldier reinforces the notion that British 
police and special forces orchestrated a counter-terrorist campaign that necessitated the use of 
force, a strategy that clearly ignored and ran afoul of legal and ethical boundaries.  
 The Gibraltar Incident attracted the attention of media outlets due to the questionable use 
of excessive force employed by the SAS members against the three unarmed IRA members. 
Because the incident garnered attention from the media and public, it also began to shed light on 
the extent of British collusion within the IRA as the media and public alike sought to understand 
how the SAS soldiers knew of the impending IRA bombing attack in Gibraltar. In the subsequent 
investigation of the incident, the media and public alike began to uncover the details behind the 
                                                          
44 Campbell, Jim. “SAS Told Shoot to Kill Says Ex-Soldier.” Sunday World, 13 Mar. 1988. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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Gibraltar Incident and how British collusion tactics played a role. In the article “IRA hunts for 
top-level mole,” Holland reported that the IRA launched a top-level investigation into how the 
British intelligence services breached its security that ended in the death of the IRA unit 
operating in Gibraltar.47  Another article titled “Mystery IRA girl knew of ambush,” Chester 
Stern and Peter Dobbie stated that new information regarding the Gibraltar Incident suggests a 
member of the IRA under the alias name of Mary Parkin tipped off British intelligence services 
of the impending terror bombing, allowing the British to prevent the IRA attack. According to 
Stern and Dobbie, Parkin was providing the police with clues to the Gibraltar target by crossing 
the border from Spain into Gibraltar every Tuesday and visiting the location of the target of the 
bombing, a guard-changing ceremony.48 Parkin’s tipoff indicates that British intelligence 
maintained informants within the IRA in order to gather intelligence and prevent future terrorist 
operations. 
 The aforementioned newspaper articles provide further evidence that suggests British 
intelligence used tactics, such as collusion, to prepare the SAS team for the interception of an 
IRA bomber unit in the Gibraltar Incident. Mary Holland’s article, “IRA hunts for top-level 
mole,” reveals that the IRA had “launched a top-level inquiry into how Britain’s intelligence 
services,” such as the Force Research Unit (FRU) and the Special Air Service (SAS), “were able 
to breach its security and shoot dead one of its units in Gibraltar.”49  Holland’s article goes on to 
report that the IRA became aware of the level of infiltration by British intelligence of top-level 
information as there was growing media attention towards British infiltration of the IRA. The 
Gibraltar Incident highlighted the level of infiltration as British special forces demonstrated that 
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highly secret information, such as the plan for a bombing attack in Gibraltar, was leaked to 
British authorities. By preventing the IRA bombing in Gibraltar, the British intelligence 
community effectively demonstrated the degree to which they had infiltrated the IRA’s ranks. 
This greatly weakened the position of the IRA, as further terrorist operations were likely to fail 
in a similar fashion as the Gibraltar Incident. The incident also produced internal investigations 
within the IRA, greatly reducing the organization’s operational capacity as well as the group’s 
morale and thus supporting the view that collusion was justifiable as it was producing effective 
results.  
In the wake of the Gibraltar Incident, the IRA was forced to investigate how British 
intelligence had infiltrated and established informers within the organization. They had to 
determine the extent of information leaked as well as how the British had employed such an 
intelligence system within the organization without being discovered. Ultimately, the incident 
placed future operations on hold out of fear that such operations would be compromised like the 
Gibraltar Incident. Because of this, many loyalists and individuals affiliated with the counter-
terrorism tactics, including Martin Ingram, claim that infiltration by British intelligence through 
the use of such tactics as planting moles and attempting to switch a member’s allegiance, proved 
effective as a counter-terrorist strategy as the FRU greatly reduced the IRA’s capacity to wage a 
terrorist campaign by diverting the group’s resources towards internal investigations as well as 
weakening morale.50 
The Gibraltar Incident not only caused internal damage for the IRA but it also garnered 
considerable media attention in both Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the United Kingdom. 
In the beginning, media attention focused on the brutality of the incident, largely due to the 
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nature of the killings as all three IRA members were unarmed. But the media also began asking 
questions about how the SAS acquired intel about the specifications of the IRA bombing 
operation. Holland notes that the “IRA admit that they now face a serious dilemma. In the past, 
an incident like Gibraltar would have brought a rush of new recruits. It is much less likely to do 
that now when educated young men and women can see that involvement in the IRA carries little 
prospect of victory.”51   The media attention surrounding the success of British infiltration of the 
IRA further persuaded potential IRA recruits that the organization was failing to prevent leaks, 
thus producing considerable distrust among those affiliated with the group. Other 
aforementioned newspaper articles brought infiltration tactics employed by British intelligence to 
the public’s attention. 52, 53 Media reports surrounding the leak of secret information effectively 
destabilized the IRA’s ties with the nationalist community in Northern Ireland which had 
supported the group. Collusion was proving effective as it dissuaded those who had or were 
aiding the group. Those who had previously aided the group by hiding members, smuggling 
weapons, providing safe houses, or providing intelligence were now less inclined to do so out of 
fear that the IRA members they were helping were truly British undercover agents. When these 
tactics of collusion became public knowledge, they had a profound effect on the part of society 
that was aiding the group, making collusion, though an ugly tactic, a justifiable one because of 
how significantly it limited the IRA. The Gibraltar Incident was just another event involving 
senseless killings in the greater terror war, but because it generated considerable media coverage, 
specifically coverage concerning how the SAS had prior knowledge of the IRA’s plans, it not 
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only weakened the IRA’s ability to carry out further attacks, it also raised questions of the 
legality with regards to how British intelligence had acquired its information. 
 During the Northern Irish terror war, or the Troubles, the British military responded to 
the IRA’s terror campaign by implementing Operation Banner. Operation Banner was the 
operation name given to British forces in Northern Ireland starting in August 1969 and ending in 
July 2007. The operation was the longest continuous deployment in British military history and 
involved the initial deployment of British troops in response to the 1969 riots. During the 
operation’s peak, as many as 21,000 British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland.  
Following the deployment of British troops in Operation Banner, the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom issued a series of acts, named the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, which began in 1974 
and ended in 1989. Designed to confer emergency powers to police forces to help them combat 
terrorism in the United Kingdom, the Acts were specifically used for the province of Northern 
Ireland.54 The Acts provided temporary powers to the security forces enabling them to question 
and detain if necessary persons traveling between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The Acts 
made membership of suspected terrorist organizations, specifically membership within the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, illegal and an arrestable offense. Membership included 
displaying signs of public support or attending meetings by a listed proscribed group. The Acts 
also included a provision section which criminalized any act including contributing to, receiving 
from, and soliciting financial support for proscribed groups. Any other resource that assisted 
terrorist organizations in any way, was declared an arrestable offense under these emergency 
powers.55   
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 The Prevention of Terrorism Acts raised the question of whether the operations of the 
Forced Research Unit (FRU), specifically those operations related to the counter-terrorist 
strategy of collusion, were illegal as they violated the emergency laws established within the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Collusion, because it involved state-paid informers working 
within the IRA’s ranks, broke the laws concerning provision of funds and attendance of 
organizations stated within the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Collusion involved British 
intelligence paying agents such as Scappaticci, Martin and Donaldson to attend IRA meetings 
and inform upon the terrorist group. But by paying IRA members for information about the 
organization, the FRU and British Intelligence at large broke the provision law, as funding an 
informer indirectly funded the organization as a whole. The opposing side to this argument claim 
that collusion did not break the laws set in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts as colluders would 
be working in compliance with British intelligence and under British authority in the attempt to 
disrupt and ultimately defeat terrorism. The problem collusion faced was that not only did 
collusion require agents to participate in IRA meetings and involve the British intelligence 
community funding agents within the IRA, but it also had agents and informers maintaining their 
position in the IRA by continuing their independent roles within the organization. For many, this 
involvement required contributing to the IRA’s violent campaign as witnessed in Scappaticci’s 
role as an interrogator and murderer as well as Keeley’s admission to making explosive devices. 
And Martin Ingram notes in his experience as a FRU handler that the FRU would go to extreme 
lengths to protect their undercover informers.56  
Scappaticci is a good example of the lengths to which British intelligence was willing to 
go in order to conceal the identity of its informants within the IRA’s ranks. For example, 
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Scappaticci, according to whistleblower and previous FRU handler Ingram, killed as many as 
forty people throughout his service in British intelligence. Scappaticci’s handlers in the FRU 
even dictated in many cases who Scappaticci was meant to kill and who he was meant to keep 
alive. Because the FRU handlers had a direct hand in Scappaticci’s murders, had critical 
intelligence that could prevent said murders but chose not to prevent the murders to protect 
Scappaticci from being revealed as an informer, they ultimately placed British intelligence with 
the dilemma of sponsoring terrorism to prevent terrorism.57 In this event, the state was 
sponsoring, to a degree, state terrorism in order to maintain an informer who had access to 
critical information coming from the IRA’s top command network. Legally, collusion violated 
the rights of the citizens of the United Kingdom as it violated the right to life. The UK, in times 
of emergency, has been known to violate citizen rights, and because of this, the Irish Troubles 
had a significant impact on the future establishment of the Human Rights Act of 1998--a 
measure which was a direct response to the number of instances in which human rights 
violations had occurred throughout the 1970s to early 1990s.58  
Freddie Scappaticci is the perfect example of an agent who was provided too much power 
by the state. Eamon Collins notes in his book Killing Rage that the IRA never suspected 
Scappaticci of being a double agent because of the amount of murders he orchestrated for the 
IRA. The terrorist group had suspected that informers infiltrated even some of the group’s high 
command, and Scappaticci’s role as interrogator was to root out any possible informers. Collins 
states that Scappaticci’s ruthless nature was what kept him from drawing attention to himself. 
Collins recalls a meeting he had with Scappaticci during his time in the IRA when he heard 
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Scappaticci recall one of his murders. Scappaticci “started joking about one informer who had 
confessed after being offered an amnesty.” According to Collins, 
Scap told the man that he would take him home…Scap had told him to keep the blindfold  
on for security reasons as they walked away from the car. ‘It was funny,’ he said,  
‘watching the bastard stumbling and falling, asking me as he felt his way along the  
railings and walls, ‘Is this my house now?’ and I’d say, ‘No, not yet, walk on some  
more...’ ‘…and then you shot the fucker in the back of the head,’ said John Joe (another  
member of the IRA), and both of them burst out laughing.59   
From Collins’ personal account, it can be deduced that the secretly employed British double 
agent Scappaticci, far from showing any remorse for his actions, actually enjoyed murdering 
other people accused by the IRA of being informers. Many of these people were innocent of any 
crime, and some were even agents working for the FRU, but were determined as expendable, as 
seen with Tom Oliver. Scappaticci’s murder campaign had been monitored by FRU handlers and 
the British intelligence community, meaning that a state-funded organization participated in 
actions that violated citizens’ rights to life.  
 It has been discussed how collusion functioned outside the law in cases in which 
evidence went missing from unsolved and ongoing investigations. Not surprisingly, this missing 
evidence involves cases bearing British intelligence’s fingerprints--cases that include the killings 
of innocent civilians, police, and British agents. But British intelligence and specifically the FRU 
have been accused of even sabotaging the efforts of police investigations in attempts to prevent 
the spy rings from being uncovered. According to The Irish Times article “Secrecy and Northern 
Ireland’s Dirty War: the murder of Pat Finucane,” reporter Ian Cobain argues that the Forced 
Research Unit may have sought to destroy incriminating information concerning cases that could 
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uncover undercover spy rings.60 According to Cobain, the murders of Pat Finucane, Loughlin 
Maginn and a string of others were under investigation by a team led by British detective John 
Stevens. The building that they were conducting each inquiry in was known as Seapark, one of 
the most secured policing buildings in the world. The detective unit kept documents pertaining to 
each case in a room named the “incident room.” On the night of January 8, 1990, the detectives 
entered the building to discover the incident room was entirely ablaze. Stevens reported that the 
fire alarms were pulled but did not sound and the heat sensitivity alarm had also failed. The 
documents within the room along with the computers were incinerated in the fire.61  
Though in the subsequent investigation, the Royal Ulster Constabulary concluded the fire 
was an accident, Stevens believes members in the FRU agency may have started the fire in an 
attempt to destroy incriminating evidence. There is little doubting the belief that both the FRU 
and the Special Branch had something to gain from the fire. According to Stevens, the 
investigation would have eventually stumbled upon the true nature of the British government’s 
role in Northern Ireland as his team had been due to arrest one of the men they believed to be 
behind the killing of Finucane and Maginn.62 According to the article, Stevens states that his 
team were about to arrest a former British soldier named Brian Nelson, who was really Agent 
6137 for the Forced Research Unit. Nelson had been on payroll and inserted by FRU into the 
Ulster Defense Association, which was a loyalist paramilitary group. The article states that 
Collins had already, by his own account, “been involved in eight murders, two attempted 
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murders, thirty-four conspiracies to murder and several other serious offences.”63 Stevens states 
that his unit was about to uncover “something extremely dangerous and difficult.” The unit was 
about to uncover evidence that the British state had been operating a death squad in Northern 
Ireland. Cobain states that though the FRU wasn’t “pulling the triggers of that squad’s guns, 
through Nelson and others, it was pulling the strings of those who did.”64 The nature of collusion 
meant the British state was actively participating in the mass murder of both its own UK and 
Irish citizens. The accusations that the FRU attempted to destroy evidence to prevent a police 
investigation is still maintained today by Stevens. Brian Nelson had been living in hiding in 
England up until his death from a brain haemorrhage on April 1, 2003, at age 55.  
 Having determined that collusion, as a counter-terrorist strategy, was ultimately an 
illegal strategy conducted by British intelligence, due to its failure to respect the citizens’ right to 
life, further discussion concerning the ethicality of collusion can now be pursued. The British 
intelligence community argue, including Ingram, that collusion as a strategy ultimately was for 
the “greater good” as the tactic served to disrupt the IRA’s terrorist campaign by dissuading new 
recruits from joining the organization. This created distrust among members within the terrorist 
group, and at times, prevented terrorist acts like the Gibraltar Incident. The participants within 
the British intelligence community reasoned, according to Ingram, that their work with collusion 
allowed the British intelligence community to infiltrate and cause disorganization among the 
IRA. The strategy of collusion was effective in providing British intelligence with vital 
information to prevent future terrorist acts as well as create a degree of confusion within the 
IRA’s command structure, as internal investigations plagued the group.  
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Examples in which collusion tactics paid off are best observed in Scappaticci’s role in 
providing information to British intelligence regarding the kidnappings of the wealthy Irish 
supermarket magnate Ben Dunne in 1981, the attempted kidnapping of Galen Weston, a 
Canadian business tycoon in 1983, and the kidnapping of supermarket boss Don Tidey in 1983.65 
Scappaticci’s position within the IRA allowed him access to information of those involved in the 
kidnapping, providing British intelligence with the means to rescue the kidnapped or even 
prevent the kidnapping from occurring. This information that Scappaticci supplied prevented the 
IRA from brokering a ransom deal that could provide the group with future funds to further their 
terrorist operations. Collusion also prevented the Gibraltar IRA bombing and created confusion 
amongst the IRA as members found it increasingly difficult to determine who was loyal and who 
was an informant.  
 Because of the muddled morals and legality surrounding collusion as a counter-terrorist 
strategy due to it being effective in saving lives and causing confusion within the IRA but at the 
expense of innocent lives lost to ensure the cover of double agents within the IRA, the question 
concerning the authority of the state or in this case, the British intelligence community, must be 
approached to determine if collusion was ultimately a justifiable counter-terrorist strategy. The 
authority of the state has been a question that many political philosophers have attempted to 
answer. Political ethics and the question concerning the authority of the state has been heavily 
discussed by such notable political thinkers as Niccolo Machiavelli in his work The Prince and 
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. In The Prince, Machiavelli’s advice to the ruler or state in how it 
should govern its peoples, at times, conflicts with itself. Machiavelli argues that a strong ruler is 
one who is both ruthless to the degree that the ruler will use any means necessary to achieve 
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control over a population, but also is a ruler who can achieve the support and love of the people 
to dissuade further revolution.66  
Machiavelli’s view of collusion, taken from the advice he supplied in his book, suggests 
that he would likely see collusion as a short-term solution by a ruler to re-stabilize the state, but 
also as a tactic that could potentially backfire and turn the population against the ruler or state, 
because the strategy produces distrust amongst the subjects and also violates the law enforced by 
the ruler or state. Machiavelli would have viewed collusion as a short-term means to defeating an 
enemy, but with implications that could produce disadvantages for the ruler or state in the future, 
as collusion would arguably precipitate long-term problems because it turns the population 
against the ruler and undermines the very laws imposed by the ruler. Former Special Branch 
Officer Raymond White, as mentioned in the BBC documentary BBC NI Spotlight Examines the 
Intelligence War Against the IRA, as well as former FRU handler Martin Ingram would both 
agree that collusion, though effective in defeating the IRA’s ability to wage terrorism and 
ultimately providing British special services with a victory in the intelligence war, ultimately 
meant a defeat in the propaganda war as collusion greatly damaged the population’s ability to 
trust its own law enforcement and justice system.67 
In Hobbes’ Leviathan, he makes mention of a “state of nature” in which in the natural 
world humans are in constant war with each other. Hobbes argues that through reason, humans 
discovered that in order to escape the state of nature and achieve security, they had to form an 
authority (government) with the power to stabilize humanity and enforce laws to allow for the 
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establishment of civilized society. Hobbes argues that by providing government with power, 
government can ensure human society does not fall back into a ‘state of nature’ in which 
neighbors fight with each other for their own personal benefit or out of fear of each other.68 
Because collusion was a counter-terrorist strategy implemented by British intelligence and armed 
forces to defeat the terrorist operations of the IRA, operations that targeted society as a whole 
and not specific groups, Hobbes would have accepted the use of collusion by the British 
government because it was a tactic that proved effective in defeating a radical paramilitary group 
enacting violence.  
It is reasonable to suggest that Hobbes’ view of collusion would be that collusion is an 
ultimately justifiable war tactic, as it is a strategy attempting to combat a group, he would deem, 
acting in a state of nature. The British government’s use of collusion, as interpreted by Hobbes’ 
political advice provided in his work Leviathan, would be acceptable because it would be a 
strategy in which the state is exercising its powers to prevent the return of the state of nature. 
Hobbes even argues in his work that the state’s decisions and actions represent the people’s 
decisions and actions, even to the extent that if the state must kill its own people to prevent a 
return of a state of nature, it could do so because such an action would truly reflect the decision 
made by society as a whole. A government cannot be guilty of state-sponsored killing because 
the state’s actions, Hobbes argues, represent the actions of the people, as the people provided the 
state with the power to maintain and secure civilization.69 In this sense, even the most brutal acts 
of collusion, such as the events in which British undercover agents were forced to kill innocent 
civilians to ensure the security of their own identity within the IRA, were ultimately justifiable 
because such actions were but a feature of the ultimate goal of preventing further violence being 
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enacted upon society by a group that Hobbes would have argued, was acting in a state of nature 
outside of society. 
Collusion as implemented by the British intelligence forces and more specifically by the 
FRU in Northern Ireland was an anti-terror strategy that ultimately succeeded in crippling the 
Irish Republican Army’s ability to continue its terror campaign. Collusion had a significant 
impact on the 1990s’ progress towards peace as British collusion within the IRA’s ranks began 
to reach the media and get exposed.70 The exposure of the extent to which the British 
intelligence had infiltrated the IRA greatly weakened the group’s recruitment and terrorist 
operations as IRA leaks indicated the group was unable to discover the British agents working 
within the organization. Because of this, the public began to view the IRA as a group that was 
collapsing in on itself. This collapse in the early 1990s brought together the eventual negotiations 
towards peace. The first ceasefire agreement was established for a three-day period between 
April 6-8, 1994, providing a starting point for further diplomacy. According to historian Tony 
Geraghty, author of The Irish War, what convinced much of the population to seek peace were 
the social initiatives that had begun in the late 1980s and into the 1990s.71 These social initiatives 
were designed to secure equal opportunity for both Protestant and Catholic citizens in 
employment, voting, and access to housing. The initiatives allowed both sides to take steps 
towards further political agreements. Historians David McKittrick and David McVea in their 
book Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict, state that 
disputes about the permanence of agreed ceasefires was an issue throughout the peace process as 
paramilitary cells continued bombings and murders during this period.72 Foreign leaders also 
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encouraged de-escalation, as then US President Bill Clinton spoke in favor of the peace process 
on 30 Nov. 1995 to huge crowds in Belfast. The Good Friday Agreement of 10 April, 1998, 
aided by the political intervention of Bill Clinton, who reached out with several telephone calls 
to party leaders encouraging the agreement, brought the peace process to final terms. According 
to McKittrick and McVea, the agreement involved prisoner release, targets for paramilitary 
decommissioning, troop reductions, provisions for polls on Irish reunification, and further civil 
rights measures.73 
But the influence of British collusion had a serious impact on the peace process, as close 
to half of the IRA leadership worked for the security forces according to British intelligence 
whistleblowers Martin Ingram and Ian Hurst. The degree of British infiltration of the IRA greatly 
diminished the organization’s ability to continue terrorist operations, as the IRA could not 
distinguish which members were legitimate and which were moles and informants. This made 
recruiting new members difficult, as the media publicly exposed British collusion. Effectively, 
the organization was beginning to fall apart by the late 1980s and early 90s, with disparate acts 
of terror being perpetrated by independent operatives or small IRA cells.  
In understanding whether collusion as a war time strategy was ethical, legal and 
ultimately justifiable, it can be concluded that the lengths to which British intelligence went to 
ensure agents maintained their identities clearly stepped past the boundaries permitted by the 
law. Those directly involved such as Freddie Scappaticci, Martin Ingram, Eamon Collins, the 
anonymous individual under the alias name “Martin,” Denis Donaldson, Peter Keeley, and Brian 
Nelson all confirm that collusion required agents to break the law in order for the strategy to 
work with any success and ensure that each agent maintained their cover. The ethicality of the 
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strategy was also overstepped as it became clear that the British state was willing to sacrifice 
both its own UK citizens, policemen and agents as well as that of the Irish in order for collusion 
to function. It is demonstrated in the cases of Scappaticci and Nelson that the British state was 
not only willing to pay such mass murderers of innocent civilians in order to have informants 
within the IRA but also hide such individuals once their cover became public. Though Nelson 
died due to complications with a brain hemorrhage in 2005, he had been hidden by British 
intelligence. To this day, Scappaticci is still being hidden, with a last confirmed sighting in Italy 
in 2007.74  
The extent to which collusion was actively used at the expense of innocent lives lost as 
well as the extent to which the state participated in acts of terror confirms with little doubt that 
the tactic gravely violated human rights and human ethics. British intelligence disagrees, arguing 
that the lives sacrificed were ultimately done so for the greater good of society in an attempt to 
defeat a terrorist organization. But many of the cases in which collusion sacrificed innocent lives 
demonstrated that British intelligence could have prevented the loss of lives but chose not to in 
order to protect their own agents. This appeared especially strong when the individuals that were 
sacrificed were either Catholic or citizens of the Irish Republic, thus demonstrating a clear bias. 
In the case of Brian Nelson, the agent actively killed Catholics under the guidance of British 
Intelligence. In terms of ethics, collusion without a doubt overstepped legal boundaries and the 
British intelligence community ultimately lost track of the enemy, becoming the very terror, they 
were attempting to destroy.  
Though it is quite clear that collusion violated both legal and ethical boundaries during 
the Northern Irish conflict, it did have a lasting impact on the IRA’s ability to wage its terror 
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campaign. The tactic clearly demonstrated cases in which it saved lives and provided intelligence 
for British forces to prevent major attacks. But the greatest impact collusion had was 
encouraging the leaders of the IRA to begin searching for a new strategy outside terrorism. This 
strategy was negotiation, and ultimately led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and the 
cessation of the Irish Dirty War.75 In this sense, collusion as a tactic, convinced the leaders of the 
IRA as well as the Republican population in Northern Ireland that the British state was willing to 
go to extreme lengths to ensure victory. The very ugliness and unethical nature of collusion 
brought the IRA and Irish people to negotiate. Ultimately, negotiation served the IRA as both 
sides benefited from the peace process. Collusion, though an illegal and unethical strategy, 
ultimately became justifiable as it tipped the scales to bring both opposing sides of the conflict 
together to secure peace. The damage collusion caused in Northern Ireland is still seen today as 
the nature of the tactic greatly fractured society at the time and continues to do so. Today, many 
of the families of those who were killed by British informants still seek justice for their loved 
ones. The British government continues to keep all mention of state-organized collusion from the 
public, withholding significant confidential files concerning cases and denying any involvement 
in double agent spy rings. If Northern Ireland intends to fully mend the division within its 
society, the British government must be willing to accept collusion as a part of its history in the 
Irish terror war, while attempting to proffer a meaningful explanation of the forces that led to the 
need of such drastic counter-terrorism tactics. 
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